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In April of 2010, the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico created possibly 
the worst environmental disaster in United States history.  In response, 
Department of Interior Secretary Kenneth Salazar, pursuant to powers 
granted to him by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, imposed a six-
month moratorium on all deepwater drilling at sea depths greater than 500 
feet.  Plaintiff drilling companies filed suit in the District Court of the 
Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the moratorium, claiming it was arbitrary and capricious.  The 
district court granted an injunction.  While on appeal in the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Secretary Salazar revoked the first moratorium and 
implemented a second moratorium in its place.  The Fifth Circuit returned 
the case to the district court on a limited remand to determine whether 
Secretary Salazar had the power to revoke the first moratorium, the 
similarities between the two moratoriums, and if the injunction against the 
first moratorium was now moot.  When the case returned to the Fifth Circuit, 
1.  J.D. candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 2007.  This Note draws on themes and
principles discussed in Hastings Constitutional Law classes.  The author would like
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the court dismissed it as moot in an unpublished opinion. 
This note analyzes three exceptions to the mootness doctrine to 
determine if the case was indeed moot.  The three exceptions in question 
are voluntary cessation, capability of repetition yet evading review, and 
collateral consequences.  This note argues that analysis of the three 
doctrines and relevant case law renders the conclusion that the instant case 
falls within the three exceptions to the mootness doctrine, and thus was not 
moot.  Further, the case should have been decided in order to instruct the 
Department of Interior and other related agencies how to best formulate a 
response should a similar event happen in the future. 
I. Introduction
The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the result of a blown rig on April
20, 2010, may be regarded as the worst environmental disaster in American 
history.  In response to the spill, President Obama requested Department of 
Interior (“DOI”) Secretary Kenneth Salazar to conduct research and make 
recommendations on how to improve drilling safety and ameliorate the 
unfolding crisis.  Inter alia, Secretary Salazar recommended a six-month 
moratorium on all deepwater drilling in the Gulf.  On May 30, 2010, the six-
month moratorium went into effect.   
On June 7, 2010, drilling company Hornbeck Offshore Services sued in 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief against Secretary Salazar and other defendants, 
claiming the moratorium was arbitrary and capricious under the 
Administrative Procedures Act.  More industry plaintiffs joined Hornbeck. 
On June 22, 2010, the court granted the injunction, holding the moratorium 
was arbitrary and capricious.2  Secretary Salazar appealed to the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
While the case was pending in the Fifth Circuit, Secretary Salazar 
revoked the moratorium, and placed a second moratorium in its place.  As 
the first moratorium, 396 Fed. Appx. 147, no longer existed, Secretary Salazar 
claimed the case was now moot.  The Fifth Circuit remanded to the district 
court to determine if Secretary Salazar had the authority to revoke the 
moratorium, the similarity between the two moratoriums, and if the 
preliminary injunction was moot.  When the case was returned to the Fifth 
Circuit, the court dismissed it as moot in an unpublished opinion.3   
This Note analyzes three exceptions to the mootness doctrine, all of 
which are applicable to the instant case.  Voluntary cessation holds that a 
2. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 639 (E.D.
La. 2010) (Hornbeck I). 
3. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 396 Fed. Appx. 147, 148 (5th
Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished) (Hornbeck II). 
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defendant’s voluntary cessation of the practice at issue does not necessarily 
moot a case.  Under wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review, if the 
challenged action was of a duration too short to be fully litigated before 
cessation, and there is a reasonable expectation the plaintiff will be 
subjected to the same action again, the case is not moot.  If a second or 
collateral consequence remains after resolution of the plaintiff’s original 
injury, the collateral consequences exception renders the case not moot.   
Allowing the court to clarify the extent and scope of Secretary Salazar’s 
power to take remedial action under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
would give the DOI guidance for the proper response to a future crisis. 
Further, if Secretary Salazar had known how to create a bona fide 
moratorium, the limited resources of the DOI and other agencies involved in 
the Hornbeck litigation could have been applied to the escalating crisis, 
rather than wasted in litigation. 
Part II of this Note examines the events leading up to the Fifth Circuit 
dismissal of the case.  Special focus is given to the proceedings prior to the 
issuance of the first moratorium, and the procedural history of the case as it 
went between the district court and Fifth Circuit.  Part III analyzes the 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine.  It begins with a look at the mootness 
doctrine generally, and then focuses on each exception individually, 
supported by case analysis.  Finally, Part IV applies the mootness exceptions 
to the instant case.  Comparing the instant case to controlling precedent 
yields that Hornbeck II should not have been dismissed as moot. 
II. The Oil Spill and Subsequent Litigation
On April 20, 2010, BP’s Deepwater Horizon semi-submersible oil rig
suffered a blowout, killing eleven workers.4  This spill was the fourth major 
spill to occur in the Gulf of Mexico in the last fifty years.5  In the month of 
July, the US government estimated that between 1.5 million to 2.5 million 
gallons of oil were leaking every day.6 
In response to the spill, President Obama formed a partisan 
commission, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, to investigate “the facts and circumstances 
concerning the cause of the blowout.”7  The President also requested that 
DOI Secretary Salazar research and report what precautions and 
technologies should be required to improve the safety of oil and gas 
4. Hornbeck I, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
5. Gulf Oil Spill (National Geographic Channel Broadcast).
6. BP: New Cap Has Stopped Flow of Gulf Oil, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, July 15,
2010, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128545316. 
7. Hornbeck I, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
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operations on the outer continental shelf.8 
After a thirty-day examination with academics and respected experts, 
Secretary Salazar issued a Report on May 27, 2010.9  The report 
recommended, among other things, a “six-month moratorium on permits for 
new wells being drilled using floating rigs . . . [and] an immediate halt to 
drilling operations on the 33 permitted wells, not including relief wells 
currently being drilled by BP, that are currently being drilled using floating 
rigs in the Gulf of Mexico.”10  The report also stated that “the 
recommendations contained in this report have been peer-reviewed by 
seven experts identified by the National Academy of Engineering.”  However, 
this statement was “factually incorrect.”11  Five of the seven experts 
publically stated that they “do not agree with the six month blanket 
moratorium on floating drilling,” and would have recommended a more 
limited moratorium.12  This has caused many to question the “probity of the 
process that led to the Report.”13  Indeed, “[t]he Report makes no effort to 
explicitly justify the moratorium.”14 
After receiving a memorandum from Secretary Salazar directing him to 
inform the drilling companies of the six-month drilling moratorium,15 the 
director of the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) ordered the Deputy 
Director of MMS to issue the following notice to drilling companies on May 
30, 2010:  
The Six-Month Deepwater Moratorium . . . directs you to cease 
drilling all new deepwater wells . . . and puts you on notice that, 
except as provided herein, MMS will not consider for six months 
from the date of this Moratorium NTL drilling permits for 
deepwater wells and for related activities as set forth herein. For 
the purposes of this Moratorium NTL, “deepwater” means depths 
greater than 500 feet.16   
On June 7, 2010, Hornbeck Offshore Services sued in the U.S. District 
8. Id.
9. Id. at 630-31.
10. Id. at 631.
11. Id.
12. Id.  (“The draft reviewed by the experts, for example, recommended a six-
month moratorium on exploratory wells deeper than 1000 feet (not 500 feet) to allow 
for implementation of suggested safety measures.”). 
13. Id. at 631.
14. Id.  (“[I]t does not discuss any irreparable harm that would warrant a
suspension of operations, it does not explain how long it would take to implement 
the recommended safety measures.”). 
15. Id.
16. Id. at 631-32.
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Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against Secretary Salazar, the DOI, MMS, and the Director of 
the MMS, for the drilling moratorium.17  More industry plaintiffs joined two 
days later.18  While the plaintiffs claimed the moratorium was arbitrary and 
capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act19 (“APA”), Secretary 
Salazar contended the action was within the powers granted to him by the 
OCSLA.20  The court heard an expedited hearing on June 21, 2010, to decide 
on a preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing the 
drilling moratorium.21 
Plaintiffs maintained that the moratorium was not only arbitrary and 
capricious under the APA, but it would also have a damaging effect on the 
local economy and the economy in general,22 while Secretary Salazar held 
that the moratorium was within the power vested to him through the 
OCSLA.23  This Note does not evaluate the merits of either argument, it 
focuses instead on the Fifth Circuit’s decision to dismiss the instant case’s 
appeal as moot. 
While acknowledging that the oil spill was “an unprecedented, sad, 
ugly and inhuman disaster,”24 the court granted the plaintiffs motion for 
preliminary injunction against the moratorium.25  The court noted that the 
“plaintiffs have established a likelihood of successfully showing the 
Administration acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the 
moratorium,”26 since “the blanket moratorium, with no parameters, seems to 
assume that because one rig failed . . . all companies and rigs drilling new 
wells over 500 feet also universally present an imminent danger.”27  Further, 
“the effect on employment, jobs, loss of domestic energy supplies caused by 
17. Id. at 632.
18. Id.
19. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 396 Fed. Appx. 147,  149 (5th
Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished) (Hornbeck II).  See also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (2011) 
(reviewing court may set aside an agency action if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
20. Hornbeck II, 396 Fed. Appx. 147 at 149.  See also 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (2011).
21. Hornbeck I, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 632.
22. Id. (“[A]n estimated 150,000 jobs are directly related to offshore
operations.  The government admits that the industry provides relatively high paying 
jobs in drilling and production activities.  Oil and gas production is quite simply 
elemental to Gulf communities…and Gulf production from these [drilling] structures 
accounts for 31% of total domestic oil production and 11% of total domestic, 
marketed natural gas production). 
23. Id. at 633-35.
24. Id. at 638.
25. Id. at 639.
26. Id. at 638.
27. Id.
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the moratorium . . . will clearly ripple throughout the economy in this 
region.”28 
Secretary Salazar, along with the other defendants from Hornbeck I, 
appealed the case to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and requested the 
court to stay the injunction pending their appeal.29  The stay was denied.30  
On July 12, Secretary Salazar revoked the drilling moratorium, and issued a 
second in its place.31  The Hornbeck II dissent notes that this second 
moratorium was almost identical to the first.32  He then moved to “vacate the 
preliminary injunction as having been mooted by his second moratorium 
order.”33  The court ordered a limited remand to the district court to 
supplement the record and determine if Secretary Salazar had the authority 
to revoke the first moratorium, the similarity between the two, and if the 
preliminary injunction was moot.34   
The district court found, on remand, that Secretary Salazar had the 
authority to revoke the first moratorium and impose the second, but the 
case challenging the validity of the first moratorium was not moot due to 
the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine.35  When the 
case was returned to the Fifth Circuit, the court dismissed the appeal as 
moot, though not without criticism.36 
This Note analyzes three exceptions to the mootness doctrine to 
determine if Hornbeck II should have been dismissed as moot.  
III. The Mootness Doctrine
A. The Mootness Doctrine Generally
A discussion of the mootness doctrine begins with the doctrine of 
standing.  Standing is “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
28. Id. at 639.
29. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 396 Fed. Appx. 147,  149 (5th





34. Id. at 150.
35. Id.
36. See id. (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“Now, in a surprising turnabout, the
majority, apparently having received unexpected answers from the district court, 
dismisses the appeal without deciding anything, on the mistaken theory that the 
question of the first moratorium’s alleged arbitrariness is moot or no longer before 
us and that, therefore any further ruling by us in this appeal would be purely an 
advisory opinion.  This decision shirks our responsibility to render judgment upon 
the matter before us.”). 
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controversy requirement of Article III.”37  This “defines with respect to the 
Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal 
Government is founded.”38  To invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction, a party 
must demonstrate three things.  First, an injury in fact that is concrete and 
particularized, and actual or imminent.39  Next, a “causal relationship 
between the injury and the challenged conduct” which can be traced to an 
action by the defendant, not an independent action of the court.40  Last, the 
likelihood the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision,” meaning the 
chance of obtaining relief from a favorable decision that is “not too 
speculative.”41 
The three aforementioned requirements are necessary for a litigant to 
bring a “live case” for a federal court to exert jurisdiction over a case that 
does not satisfy those requirements would be outside the federal judicial 
power of our democratic system and “infringe on the province of the 
legislative and executive branches.”42  If the requirements for a live case are 
not met, if “there no longer is an actual controversy between adverse 
litigants,”43 the case is moot.44 
The mootness doctrine holds that “an actual controversy must exist at 
all stages of federal court proceedings . . . [and] if events subsequent to the 
filing of the case resolve the dispute, the case should be dismissed as 
moot.”45  The Supreme Court explained that “mootness [is] the doctrine of 
standing in a time frame . . . [t]he requisite personal interest that must exist 
at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout 
its existence (mootness),”46 though not all Supreme Court Justices agree 
with the ‘standing in a time frame’ characterization.47   
37. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992)). 
38. Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
39. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
40. Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
41. Id. at 663-64 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 752).
42. Michael Ashton, Note: Recovering Attorney’s Fees With The Voluntary Cessation
Exception To Mootness Doctrine After Buckhannon Board And Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 977 (2002) 
(quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 750). 
43. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS 129 (Vicki Been et al., eds., 5th
ed. 2007). 
44. Ashton, supra note 43.
45. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44.
46. Id. (quoting United States Parole Comm’n. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397
(1980)) (quotations omitted). 
47. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
190 (2000)) (Ginsburg, J.) (“[T]he description of mootness as “standing set in a time 
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The Supreme Court has noted the “flexible character of the Article III 
mootness doctrine,”48 embodied in the four exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine: voluntary cessation, capable of repetition yet evading review, 
collateral consequences, and class action.  Of interest to this note are the 
first three exceptions. 
B. The Voluntary Cessation Exception
The voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine holds that 
a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a disputed practice does not render a 
case moot,49 for “if it did, the courts would be compelled to leave [the] 
defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.”50  Indeed, the standard to 
determine if the defendant’s voluntary conduct mooted a case is 
“stringent.”51 “A case might become moot if subsequent events made it 
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably 
be expected to recur.”52  The burden of showing the court the practice will 
not reasonably be expected to recur falls on the party claiming mootness.53 
In Friends of the Earth, multiple citizens groups brought suit against 
Laidlaw Environmental Services under the Clean Water Act seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties.54  Laidlaw 
moved for summary judgment, claiming the plaintiffs presented no evidence 
showing injury in fact, thus lacked standing to bring suit.55  The district court 
rejected the motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiffs had standing 
“by the very slimmest of margins,” and awarded plaintiffs a civil penalty, but 
declined the injunctive relief because defendants had been in compliance 
with its permit for some time.”56  Plaintiffs appealed, alleging the penalty 
was inadequate, while defendants cross-appealed, claiming plaintiffs lacked 
standing.57 
frame” is not comprehensive . . . a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance 
moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the 
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to occur.”). But see id. 
at 212 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I am troubled by the Court’s too-hasty retreat from our 
characterization of mootness as the ‘doctrine of standing set in a time frame.’”). 
48. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 131(quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 400).
49. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).
50. Id.  (quoting U.S. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).
51. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189.
52. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199,
203 (1968)). 
53. Id.
54. Id. at 176-177.
55. Id. at 177.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 179.
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Without reaching the standing question, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled the case was moot because “the only remedy currently 
available to [petitioners] - civil penalties payable to the government - would 
not redress any injury” petitioners had suffered.58 
According to the defendant, after the Fourth Circuit ruling, but before 
the Court granted certiorari (“cert”), the polluting entity in question was 
closed and discharges ceased.59  The Court hence granted cert to answer 
whether “a defendant’s compliance with its permit after commencement of 
litigation does not moot claims for civil penalties under the Act.”60 
In finding the plaintiffs did indeed suffer injury-in-fact, the Court 
explained, “environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when 
they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the 
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the 
challenged activity.”61  In addition, “civil penalties . . . afford redress to 
citizen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened62 with injury as a 
consequence of ongoing unlawful conduct.”  After concluding the plaintiffs 
had standing, the court turned to the mootness issue.63   
Laidlaw asserted that the “closure of its Roebuck facility, which took 
place after the Court of Appeal issued its decision, mooted the case.”64  In 
dismissing this assertion, the Court noted that the “facility closure . . . might 
moot the case, but . . . only if one or the other of these events made it 
absolutely clear that Laidlaw’s permit violations could not reasonably be 
expected to recur.65  Further, “the effect of both Laidlaw’s compliance and 
the facility closure on the prospect of future violations is a disputed factual 
matter.”66  The case was remanded.67 
More analogous to the present case, “compliance with a court order 
renders a case moot only if there is no possibility that the allegedly 
offending behavior will resume once the order expires or is lifted.”68 
In Vitek v. Jones, appellee prisoner was transferred to a mental hospital 
pursuant to a Nebraska statute that provided for the involuntary 
commitment of prisoners who “‘suffers from a mental disease or defect’ that 
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 180.
61. Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
62. Id. at 186.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 193.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 195.
68. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 143.
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‘cannot be given proper treatment’ in prison.”69  The district court held that 
this transfer “without adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing 
deprived him of liberty without due process” pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.70  The court permanently enjoined appellee’s transfer without 
these procedures.71  Appellee was subsequently paroled, but sent back to 
prison for violating parole.72  The district court found that “the parole and 
revocation thereof did not render the case moot because appellee was still 
subject to being transferred to the mental hospital.”73  In affirming that the 
case was not moot, the Court stated “[u]nder these circumstances, it is not 
‘absolutely clear,’ absent the injunction, that the State’s alleged wrongful 
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”74 
C. Wrongs Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
Exception
In finding a case not moot due to wrongs capable of repetition yet 
evading review, a case must satisfy two elements: “(1) the challenged action 
was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 
expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.”75   
The D.C. Circuit explains that “[b]y ‘evading review’ ‘the Supreme Court 
has meant evading Supreme Court review.’”76  Hence, “agency actions of less 
than two years’ duration cannot be ‘fully litigated’ prior to cessation or 
expiration.”77  Further, “[a]nother area where the Court often has applied this 
exception to the mootness doctrine is for challenges to election laws.”78 
In Murphy v. Hunt, appellee was denied bail due to his particular 
offense in Nebraska state court, pursuant to the Nebraska Constitution.79  
While his trial was pending in state court, appellee filed a complaint under 
42 U.S.C § 1983 in district court, claiming that provision of the Nebraska 





74. Id. at 481.
75. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). 
76. Del Monte v. U.S., 570 F.3d 316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). 
77. Id. (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 236 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir.
2001)). 
78. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 137.  See First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774 (1978).  See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
79. Murphy, 455 U.S. at 480.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 2012 
417 
Constitution violated his civil rights, and sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief.80  While the district court case was pending, appellee was convicted of 
his charges in Nebraska state court, and he appealed to the Nebraska 
Supreme Court.81  The district court then dismissed his claim, but the Eighth 
Circuit reversed, finding his bail denial violated his Eighth Amendment 
right.82 
The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that the Eighth Circuit’s 
application of the capable of repetition yet evading review exception was 
misplaced.83  A per curium majority explained that the exception requires a 
“‘reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that the same 
controversy will recur involving the same complaining party . . . [w]e detect 
no such level of probability in this case.”84  As “[t]here is no reason to expect 
that all three of Hunt’s convictions will be overturned on appeal,” there is no 
reasonable expectation he will be eligible for bail again, and hence the case 
is moot.85 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart presents the exception in the context 
of prior restraint on speech.86  A multiple homicide trial in a Nebraska state 
court drew large local and national attention.87  Reasoning that prejudicial 
news would make it difficult to impanel an impartial jury, the judge granted 
a restrictive order.88  Among other things, the order prohibited those in 
attendance of the trial from releasing any evidence or testimony.89  
Petitioners from the press moved in district court to have the order 
vacated.90  The district court judge modified the restrictive order, but kept 
many of the provisions.91  The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the findings 
of the district court, and the Supreme Court granted cert to address the 
“important issues raised by the district court order as modified by the 
Nebraska Supreme Court.”92  Before the case reached the Supreme Court, 
the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.93 
Though the order in question expired when the jury was impaneled 
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 480-81.
83. Id. at 483.
84. Id. at 482 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. at 149).
85. Id. at 483.
86. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
87. Id. at 542.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 543.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 546.
93. Id.
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approximately four months earlier, the Court held the case was not moot, as 
it was indeed capable of repetition, yet evading review.94  First, if the 
defendant’s conviction was reversed and another trial ordered, “the District 
Court may enter another restrictive order to prevent a resurgence of 
prejudicial publicity before [his] retrial.”95  Second, the “Nebraska Supreme 
Court’s decision authorizes state prosecutors to seek restrictive orders in 
appropriate cases.  The dispute between the State and the petitioners who 
cover events throughout the State is thus ‘capable of repetition.’”96  Further, 
since these orders are short-lived, they will evade review if the case was 
dismissed for mootness.97 
D. Collateral Consequences Exception
Where “a secondary or ‘collateral’ injury survives” after the resolution 
of the plaintiff’s principle injury, the collateral consequences exception 
renders the case not moot.98  This is possibly seen most starkly in criminal 
cases, where a “defendant continues to face adverse consequences of the 
criminal conviction.”99  Just as criminal convictions can result in a loss of 
voting privileges or a bar from obtaining certain occupational licenses, the 
Court has held “even if the primary injury, incarceration, no longer exists, 
the secondary or collateral harms are sufficient to prevent the case from 
being dismissed on mootness grounds.”100  However, the collateral 
consequences exception is also seen in the civil arena, concerning such 
issues as back pay and injunctions.101 
Super Tire Engineering Company v. McCorkle presents the paradigm case of 
collateral consequences.102  At the time, New Jersey workers were “eligible for 
public assistance through state welfare programs.”103  When their employees 
went on strike, two corporations filed suit in District Court for declaratory 
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 546-47.
97. Id. At 547.
98. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 132 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 53 (1968)).  However, some scholars maintain the collateral consequences 
exception is not an exception at all, because the case was never moot.  See id.  
(“[A]ctually the case is not moot because some injury remains that could be 
redressed by a favorable court decision.”). 
99. Id.
100. Id.  See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55 (1968) (criminal convictions entail adverse
legal consequences).  See also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (defendant 
cannot engage in certain businesses as a result of his conviction). 
101. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 134.
102. 416 U.S. 115 (1974).
103. Id. at 116.
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and injunctive relief, claiming that their striking employees “had received 
and would continue to receive public assistance” through New Jersey welfare 
programs, and this “constituted an interference with the federal labor policy 
of free collective bargaining expressed in the Labor Management Relations 
Act.”104  Before the court heard the case, the strike ended and the employees 
returned to work.105  The district court denied plaintiff’s relief and dismissed 
the case, and on appeal, the Third Circuit dismissed for mootness.106  The 
court granted cert to decide on the mootness issue.107 
Though the strike ended, the “petitioners and New Jersey officials may 
still retain sufficient interests and injury as to justify the award of 
declaratory relief.”108  Unlike the cases cited by respondents, the government 
activity in the instant case “has not evaporated or disappeared, and by its 
continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well be a substantial 
adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.”109  Here, because 
the said law is still in effect, the “challenged governmental action has not 
ceased.”110  To require a live labor dispute is to ask too much.  Instead, “[i]t is 
sufficient . . . the litigant show the existence of an immediate and definite 
governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to 
affect a present interest.”111  Further, “the great majority of economic strikes 
do not last long enough for complete judicial review of the controversies 
they engender.”112  
On the other hand, Spencer v. Kemna exemplifies a claim too weak for 
the petitioner to be suffering from collateral consequences.113  In 1992, the 
Missouri Board of Probation and Parole revoked petitioner’s parole.114  After 
not receiving relief from the Missouri state courts, petitioner filed a writ of 
habeas corpus in district court, “alleging that he had not received due 
process in the parole revocation proceedings.”115  Before the district court 
responded, however, petitioner was released from prison, and his habeas 
petition was dismissed.116  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling, holding the 
claim was moot because petitioner “suffered no ‘collateral consequences’ of 
104. Id. at 117-19.
105. Id. at 120.
106. Id. at 121.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 122.
109. Id. at 122.
110. Id. at 123.
111. Id. at 125-26.
112. Id. at 126.
113. 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 6.
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the revocation order.”117  The Court granted cert to decide if the “petitioner’s 
subsequent release caused the petition to be moot.”118 
The Court could find no “continuing collateral consequence” of 
petitioner’s parole revocation, and hence dismissed the case as moot.119  
Citing a sequence of cases, the majority ran though a brief history of the 
collateral consequences doctrine120, observing that the Court now proceeds 
to “accept the most generalized and hypothetical of consequences as 
sufficient to avoid mootness in challenges to conviction”,121 to their 
disapproval.122  The Court noted that parole revocations do not entail the 
same “adverse collateral legal consequences [as] most criminal 
convictions”.123  As such, petitioner failed to bring a live case or controversy, 
and his case was dismissed as moot.124 
IV. The Mootness Exceptions Applied to Hornbeck II
A. Voluntary Cessation
As discussed supra, the voluntary cessation exception holds that a 
defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a 
federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice, and that 
mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case. 
As the district court noted in Hornbeck II, “in light of the voluntary cessation 
exception to the mootness doctrine, the case challenging the validity of the 
DOI’s first moratorium was not moot.”125  The court most likely made this 
assertion because the defendant (Secretary Salazar) voluntarily ceased the 
117. Id.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 8.
120. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 87 (1943) (moral stigma is not a
collateral consequence);  Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (petitioner’s 
conviction is a collateral consequence because he cannot engage in certain 
businesses or vote in any election in New York State);  Pollard v. United States, 352 
U.S. 354 (1957) (a convict, who already served his time, presents a live case 
challenging his sentence);  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (because respondent 
had not been pardoned, his habeas challenge was not moot). 
121. Id. at 10.
122. See id. at 12 (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he practice of presuming collateral
consequences . . . sits uncomfortably beside the ‘long-settled principle that standing 
cannot be “inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings,” but rather 
“must affirmatively appear in the record”’”) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 
215, 231 (1990)).  
123. Id. at 12  (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55 (1968)).
124. Id. at 18.
125. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 396 Fed. Appx. 147, 150 (5th
Cir. Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished) (Hornbeck II). 
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challenged practice (the first moratorium).  
In Friends of the Earth, defendant Laidlaw claimed that closing their 
polluting facility and ceasing discharges put them in compliance with their 
permit, and thus mooted plaintiff’s claims for civil damages.126  In holding 
the case was not mooted, the court asserted that the “facility closure . . . 
might moot the case, but . . . only if one or other of the events made it 
absolutely clear that Laidlaw’s permit violations could not reasonably be 
expected to recur,127 and “compliance with a court order renders a case moot 
only if there is no possibility that the allegedly offending behavior will 
resume once the order expires or is lifted.”128 
In the instant case, there is not a possibility that the allegedly 
offending behavior will resume; it has resumed.  By lifting the first moratorium 
and implementing the second, Secretary Salazar has resumed the allegedly 
offending behavior.  Certainly, lifting the first moratorium and implementing 
the second should not have mooted plaintiff’s action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the first moratorium. 
Appellee prisoner in Vitek v. Jones was transferred without notice or 
hearing to an involuntary commitment mental hospital.129  He filed suit, and 
the district court found that the transfer without hearing or notice violated 
his due process.130  The court permanently enjoined the transfer absent 
those procedures.131  After appellee was paroled, but sent back to prison for 
violating his parole, the court found that the parole and revocation did not 
moot the case because he could still potentially be sent back to a mental 
hospital.132  The case was not moot because absent an injunction, it was not 
absolutely clear the State’s wrongful behavior would not recur.133 
Likewise, in the present case, the district court granted an injunction 
over the first moratorium but that injunction was lost with the revocation of 
the first moratorium.  The Vitek court noted that absent an injunction, it was 
not absolutely clear the State’s wrongful behavior would not recur, and thus 
the case was not moot.  Here, that fear came true.  As the district court 
placed an injunction only over the first moratorium, the defendant’s alleged 
wrongful behavior recurred with the issuance of the second moratorium. 
Hornbeck II should not have been mooted so the court could have decided if 
the first moratorium should have been enjoined, thus instructing whether to 
enjoin similar future moratoriums.   
126. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000).
127. Id. at 186.
128. Id.




133. Id. at 481.
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B. Wrongs Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
This exception requires (1) the challenged action was in its duration 
too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) 
there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would 
be subjected to he same action again.134  The D.C. Circuit instructs that “[b]y 
“evading review . . . the Supreme Court has meant evading Supreme Court 
review.”135  Hence, “agency actions of less than two years’ duration cannot be 
“fully litigated” prior to cessation or expiration.”136   
By revoking the first moratorium, the DOI made the challenged action 
(the moratorium) too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 
expiration, fulfilling prong one of the test.  Likewise, prong two of this test is 
clearly satisfied; the complaining party (plaintiffs) were subjected to the 
same action again (the second moratorium).  The first moratorium was thus 
capable of repetition, yet evading review.   
In Murphy v. Hunt, appellee was denied bail pursuant to a Nebraska 
statute, and while his trial was pending in Nebraska state court, he filed suit 
in district court alleging civil rights violations, and sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief.137  While his case was pending in district court, he was 
convicted of his charges in Nebraska state court, and appealed to the 
Nebraska Supreme Court.138  The district court ruled his case moot, but the 
8th Circuit reversed.  The Supreme Court reversed again, finding this was not 
a case of capable of repetition yet evading review, because there is no 
reasonable expectation that all three of appellee’s convictions will be 
overturned on appeal, thus no reasonable expectation he will be subjected 
to bail again, hence the case was moot.   
Unlike Murphy, here there is plainly a reasonable expectation plaintiffs 
will be subjected to the challenged action because they already are subjected to 
the challenged action.  For the case to be mooted, the burden is on defendants 
to show the challenged action cannot reasonably be expected to recur.  That 
burden is obviously failed with the imposition of the second moratorium. 
Petitioners from the press appealed a restrictive order over press 
coverage of a homicide trial in Nebraska Press Association. v. Stuart, claiming 
prior restraint on speech.139  Before their appeal could reach the Supreme 




137. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 480 (1982).
138. Id.
139. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 543 (1976).
140. Id. at 546.
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because it was capable of repetition, yet evading review.141  First, if a new 
trial was ordered for the defendant, the court could impose a similar 
restraining order.142  Second, prosecutors could seek similar orders in future 
trials, thus the practice is capable of repetition.143  Lastly, because these 
orders are short lived, compared to the time it takes a case to reach the 
Court, they will likely evade review.144 
Nebraska Press Association is closely analogous to the instant case.  The 
Court made three observations in concluding the case was not moot due to 
the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception.  First, if a new 
homicide trial was ordered, the court could impose a similar restraining 
order.  The court ordering another restraining order is strikingly similar to 
the DOI imposing another moratorium - which already happened.  Second, 
prosecutors could seek similar orders in the future, making the practice 
capable of repetition.  Again, the imposition of the second restraining order 
makes clear this is not a practice capable of repetition, but a repeated 
practice.  Lastly, the orders at issue in Nebraska Press Assn. were short lived, 
thus capable of evading review.  Discussed supra, agency actions of duration 
less than two years will evade review because the Supreme Court in such a 
short time will not decide upon them.  By virtue of the fact the moratorium 
in question was mandated for six months, it would evade review.  For these 
three aforementioned reasons, the instant case is not moot because it is 
capable of repetition, yet evading review. 
C. Collateral Consequences
Discussed supra, where a secondary or collateral injury remains after 
the resolution of the plaintiff’s principle injury, the collateral consequences 
exception renders the case not moot. 
In Super Tire, plaintiff employers brought suit for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against a New Jersey law that gave welfare assistance to 
their striking employees, claiming that was an interference with free labor 
policy and collective bargaining protected in the Labor Management 
Relations Act.145  Before the district court decided the case, the strike ended, 
and the employees returned to work.146  The district court dismissed the case 
as moot, and the Third Circuit affirmed.147  The Court reversed, finding 
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 547.
144. Id.
145. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1974).
146. Id. at 120.
147. Id. at 121.
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because the law was still in effect, the government action has not ceased,148 
and continues to have a substantial adverse effect on the petitioning 
parties.149  Indeed, to render this case not moot, litigants must just show 
“the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy 
that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest.”150 
Likewise, in the instant case, though the first moratorium was lifted, 
the second moratorium remains, thus exemplifying a Super Tire “immediate 
and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and 
continues to affect a present interest.”  In addition, the second moratorium 
is “almost identical to the first, reaching similar offshore drilling activities, 
for the same six-month duration and based largely upon the same 
administrative record.”151   
Further, the moratorium(s) affect not only the plaintiff’s present 
interest, but also the public at large.  As the district court in Hornbeck I noted, 
“courts have held that in making the determination of irreparable harm, 
‘both harm to the parties and to the public may be considered,’”152 and 
indeed, the “effect on employment, jobs, loss of domestic energy supplies 
caused by the moratorium as the plaintiffs (and other suppliers, and the rigs 
themselves) lose business, and the movement of the rigs to other sites 
around the world will clearly ripple throughout the economy in this 
region.”153  Thus, the collateral consequences of the first moratorium extend 
not only to the plaintiff drilling companies, but also to all members of the 
public, both directly and indirectly affected. 
V. Conclusion
Evidenced in the argument above, the Hornbeck II court should not have
dismissed the case as moot.  Many (hopefully all) would agree that 
something needed to be done, immediately, to address the unfolding oil 
spill disaster.  Secretary Salazar, in his position as head of the department of 
State charged with protecting America’s natural resources, was correct in 
taking action that he determined was necessary to alleviate the situation 
and was within his powers granted by OSCLA.  However, Hornbeck II should 
have been ruled upon to determine the extent and scope of the Secretary’s 
powers under OSCLA and the APA — not as a condemnation against his 
148. Id. at 123.
149. Id. at 122.
150. Id. at 125-26.
151. Hornbeck v. Salazar, 396 Fed. Appx. 147, 149-50  (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2010)
(Hornbeck II). 
152. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 639 (E.D.
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actions — but to give guidance and direction on how to best formulate a 
response, should a similar situation arise in the future.  The Hornbeck I 
district court found that the Secretary’s first moratorium was arbitrary and 
capricious.  If the Secretary had known in advance how to best craft an 
appropriate moratorium, the precious resources of the DOI (and other 
agencies involved), that were wasted on litigation, could have been put 
towards addressing the crisis at hand. 
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   *** 
